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WWith an estimated average loss of around 13 million hectares per year between 2000 and 2005 – 7.3 million hectares if reforestation is taken into account, 
according to FAO –, tropical deforestation is a major source of greenhouse gas 
emissions. At around 4.4 to 5.5 GtCO2 per year (the latter including peat forest 
degradation) according to the latest estimates, these emissions account for about 
12 to 15% of annual anthropogenic CO2 emissions (from 8 to 20% taking into 
account the considerable uncertainties in the deforestation and degradation 
estimates). Moreover, tropical deforestation has a devastating impact on biologi-
cal diversity, since tropical forests contain over two thirds of the 250 000 higher 
plants known to scientists.
At present, emissions caused by deforestation in developing countries are regu-
lated neither by the Framework Convention on Climate Change nor by the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, the issue of “avoided deforestation” is expected to be one of 
the difficult areas of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Copen-
hagen, December 2009), which will propose a post-Kyoto “climate” regime. Is 
the solution a market mechanism to “reward” actors or a fund to finance reforms 
that tackle the causes? The debate is open. 
Ineffective tools
Deforestation is a problem that mainly concerns developing countries. Yet these countries 
are not committed to quantified emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
They only participate in the collective effort through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), for which tree planting projects are eligible. These are emissions reduction projects 
for which the promoters can earn certified “carbon credits”, which are negotiable on 
specialised markets. To date, “forest” CDM projects (afforestation and reforestation) have 
been something of a failure: only 8 projects have been registered out of almost 1 900. As 
for non-forest CDM projects, we now know that many of them have failed to comply with 
the rules on establishing baseline scenarios, against which the reductions attributed to the 
project are measured. Furthermore, contrary to the hopes expressed when it was created, 
the CDM has not prevented the massive use of coal in emerging countries.
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Another market mechanism, whose procedures are not as lengthy, costly or binding, has 
been set up: voluntary carbon offset schemes. These make it possible to sell carbon credits 
to companies or entities (large towns, institutions, etc.) wishing to mitigate the emis-
sions linked to their activities. Although more and more of these projects are certified 
by third parties, at least one condition is not evaluated in many cases: additionality, in 
other words the “net” effects of the private action (project) or public action (policies, 
measures) that are attributed to this action alone, irrespective of the circumstances that 
would occur in the absence of this action. Difficult to respect, it is nevertheless essential 
in a market-based emission trading system: if the carbon credits acquired by companies 
and countries do not come from projects that have actually brought about changes in 
practices, this amounts to generating “hot air”.
In 2005, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, which includes around 30 southern 
forest countries, proposed a new mechanism called REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation), or “avoided deforestation”. The idea is simple: paying 
developing countries that reduce deforestation over a given period. It has generated 
unprecedented enthusiasm among the international community, and the 13th Confer-
ence of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Bali, 2007) suggested that it should be included in 
the post-Kyoto agreement.
The thorny problem of the baseline scenario
The choice of the reference period used to measure the reduction in deforestation is 
one of the thorniest issues regarding REDD. Should the deforestation level during the 
commitment period (probably 2013-2017) be compared with a past period, or with a 
projected business-as-usual scenario, possibly modified according to political and equity 
criteria? The method chosen will have different implications depending on the country. 
Countries that have seen high deforestation rates in the recent past and which have little 
forest cover will come out on top if a past period is taken into consideration. Conversely, 
countries whose deforestation rate was low in the past but is expected to rise due to 
investment in road infrastructure and the extension of agricultural areas are in favour of 
a business-as-usual scenario that takes into consideration their development needs. This 
was the proposal supported in negotiations by the Central African countries belonging 
to the COMIFAC (Commission for the Forests of Central Africa).
Referring to the past assumes that deforestation patterns will be constant over time. 
However, there is little reason to suppose this would be the case. Deforestation rates are 
Redd: 
four possible 
structures
Cap-and-trade
States are paid according to a baseline or a politi-
cally negotiated deforestation reduction target. 
Credits generated by REDD, which are fungible, are 
integrated into the market. Companies and States 
can acquire them in order to implement actions of 
their choosing.
Decentralised market mechanism
Modelled on the CDM procedures with a broader 
range of eligible activities, REDD projects, rather 
than States, would benefit from certified carbon 
credits that could be traded on the international 
emissions allowances market.
A variation of this proposal consists in sharing 
credits between projects and States (the nested 
approach). This would provide direct funding for 
projects but would not prevent the risk of “leak-
age”, in other words a simple geographical shift in 
deforestation, rather than a global reduction.
International fund  
to finance structural reforms
This possibility avoids the need to develop national 
baseline scenarios and aims to mobilise the funding 
required to conduct structural reforms at the national 
level and payment for environmental services (PES) 
programmes targeted at local actors, in the regions 
threatened by deforestation.
Since the last Conference of the Parties in Poznan´ 
(2008), negotiators are talking about REDD+: the 
activities that could be remunerated go beyond 
avoided deforestation and include reforestation, 
forest conservation and forest management.
International fund to remunerate 
national results
This system is similar to cap-and-trade, but payments 
for States are not linked to the emissions trading 
market or negotiable on it.
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linked to the level of development and to demographic transition, and they tend to slow 
as forests are depleted. In Malaysia and in several parts of Indonesia, the major lowland 
forests have been massively converted in the last 20 years into oil palm plantations and 
other agricultural activities. The major remaining forests are mainly found in mountainous 
or remote regions, which cost more to exploit and convert. Future reductions will thus 
be largely “mechanical”, linked to the depletion of forests. In contrast, the Congo Basin 
countries have relatively low deforestation rates, not because of any “good governance”, 
but because of the poor state of their infrastructure and the limited appeal of this region 
for major agricultural investments. In the immense Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
the annual deforestation rate is 0.21%, but there is no doubt that if the political situation 
stabilises, road infrastructure repairs and the return of private investment will result in a 
rise in deforestation, at least in the short term.
If we choose not to use past data alone, we must attempt to predict future deforestation 
based on the anticipated evolution of key variables. But deforestation rates are not only 
influenced by relatively predictable 
factors such as population size or road 
infrastructure. They are also affected 
by random events such as conflicts 
(which trigger migration), fluctua-
tions in major agricultural commodity 
prices, changes in currency parity and 
climate variations (which reduce or 
increase the risks of large-scale fires 
and have a considerable impact on 
deforestation).
In Brazil, for example, deforesta-
tion varies greatly from one year to 
another. Fluctuations in the prices of 
agricultural products (beef, soy, etc.) 
are largely responsible for frequent 
reversals of the trend. While “predictive” models can more or less anticipate where the 
next deforestation will take place (usually close to roads), they are incapable of telling 
when they will occur: this depends particularly on agricultural prices – and, incidentally, 
on the price of wood – which vary according to global market speculation.
A number of proposals have been put forward to attempt to solve this problem, aimed at 
limiting the quantity of credits that can be acquired in order to limit the risk of producing 
hot air, which seems to be in contradiction with the idea that strong financial incentives 
are needed to ensure States act. But no system makes it possible to tell whether payments 
will in fact correspond to additional reductions that can be attributed to the policies and 
actions implemented. The strategic behaviour of States will also have to be taken into 
account. For example, despite its very low deforestation rates to date, Guyana presented 
a baseline scenario in August 2009 that anticipated the conversion of 90% of its forests 
into industrial crops over the next 25 years; this was in order to maximise its chances of 
being paid for any deforestation rate below this figure. Another potential perverse effect 
is that a form of environmental blackmail may become widespread (“pay me or I will let 
my forests be destroyed”), quite the opposite of the government responsibility required 
on such a critical issue for the public good.
The risk with a cap-and-trade system based on “performances” (reducing deforestation 
relative to a baseline) is that it may remunerate the result of circumstances rather than 
efforts. If, however, a market mechanism is chosen, it is likely that this will contribute 
to introducing hot air, when the market is struggling to maintain a carbon price that is 
high enough to be dissuasive. By offering new ways out for high emissions-producing 
nations and companies, this solution further weakens the incentive system sought by 
the Kyoto Protocol.
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in the Brazilian Amazon, 
1990-2007
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Tackling structural problems
The option of an international fund for agricultural land transformation policies is the 
only one that tackles the structural causes of deforestation and finances reforms whose 
impact on deforestation cannot be directly and immediately measured; something the 
market cannot do. The priorities will differ from one country to another, but there are 
clear benefits (and not only for forests) to agricultural land reforms that strengthen farmers’ 
property rights and introduce more productive and sustainable farming practices. Rec-
ognising enforceable land rights for forest-dwelling communities will help them to cope 
with the neocolonial land-grab led by agribusiness groups looking for relatively unpopu-
lated forest areas. Governance is also a key issue: financing the reorganisation of forest 
administration and of monitoring systems may prove decisive. As may the consolidation 
of the legal system: many laws exist to protect forests, but too often they are violated with 
complete impunity. As an eminently political process, these ambitious reforms, especially 
those concerning land, produce winners and losers. Ensuring they are accepted implies 
compensation for the losers, hence the need for a well-endowed fund.
The country level is not the only one at which to act. Encouraging farmers to conserve 
trees, to plant new ones and to protect existing forests requires large-scale payment for 
environmental services (PES) programmes. But payments of this kind will only result 
in lasting transformations if they are accompanied by support for changes in technical 
agricultural processes and accompanying programmes to perpetuate them (rural credit, 
insurance, stabilised prices, land registries, etc.). This implies evaluating the financial 
needs of these programmes over and above the opportunity cost alone (the cost associated 
with ending deforestation practices). The permanence of emissions reductions (a forest 
may burn or be replaced by other uses) and additionality (the forest would be conserved 
even without payments) are problems that do not disappear with PES, but attempts can 
be made to contain them through the prior assessment of projects, as in the case of the 
CDM; something that is not possible with a national market-based approach, since pay-
ment, which is unconditional, is based on “results”.
This leaves financing. Official aid is inconstant and limited. The European Union put 
forward the idea of attributing some of the revenue generated by the auction of emissions 
allowances planned for the post-2013 period to combating deforestation; but even if this 
materialised, it would still not be enough. Mexico proposed a global climate change fund 
supported by contributions from all nations and particularly based on equity criteria. Last-
ing funding to combat deforestation demands new resources that could be provided by an 
international tax system based on the taxation of financial transactions or on greenhouse 
gas emissions and energy consumption. It may prove difficult to rapidly reach an inter-
national agreement on the matter, but opting for an unsuitable mechanism (the carbon 
market) just because it is easier to come to an international agreement on this option since 
it does not involve any unpopular measures would be a short-sighted decision.
Beyond this lies the issue of our individual and collective consumption patterns. Forests are 
converted to meet the growing demand for beef; soy is used to feed cattle; the demand for 
palm oil is stimulated by the demand for agrofuels; and the increase in paper consumption 
leads to deforestation in the degraded Indonesian forests in order to plant quick-growing 
species, etc. Economic instruments are needed to modify collective choices, but let it not 
be thought that their magic will enable us to avoid questioning our development patterns.
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